A dash of charm and a pinch of spice: how moscow uses telegram to spread news about the baltics

This article was written by Inga Spriņģe and published in Russian on Re:Baltica.

Saving “political prisoners” in the Baltics, sharing nostalgic Soviet-era photos, and offering “alternative” takes on Latvia’s economy — these are just a few of the tasks promised last year by a network of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in exchange for funding from a Moscow-based organization that supports “compatriots abroad.”

Documents obtained by Re:Baltica and the TV show Nekā personīga reveal that Russia’s "Foundation for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad" — known as Pravfond — granted €109,000 (11.5 million rubles) to former Latvian journalist Alexey Stefanov to grow a network of propaganda Telegram channels.

Re:Baltica has reviewed the project proposal for 2025 and its first-quarter report. The proposal claims that Telegram is now the only platform where Russian speakers in the Baltics can access "objective information," since most Russian media outlets are blocked in the region. While pro-Kremlin bloggers do exist in the Baltics, the document says, they don’t always align fully with Moscow’s narratives. Hence, the applicant created new Telegram channels and merged them with like-minded channels into a "virtual network."

The project was formally submitted under the name Anna Stefanova — likely Stefanov’s wife, as his Facebook profile features a wedding photo with a woman bearing the same name. Stefanov himself is listed as the project’s editor-in-chief and described as an employee of Russia’s state-owned media conglomerate Rossiya Segodnya.

Reached by phone, Stefanov denied any connection to the Telegram channels and quickly ended the call: “I don’t understand what you’re talking about. Sorry, I can’t talk right now.”

The “baltic bridge” and soviet nostalgia

The Telegram network consists of five identified channels. Two operate in Russian — Baltic Bridge and Baltic Shadows. A third Russian-language channel, Baltics Uncensored, was mentioned in the documents but could not be located by Re:Baltica.

The other three operate in Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian under culturally evocative names: Laimes lācis (“Lucky Bear,” from a Latvian fairy tale), Vardan tos Lietuvos! (“For the Good of Lithuania,” from the Lithuanian anthem), and Vana Toomase teataja (named after Tallinn’s Old Town statue, "Old Thomas"). These channels present themselves as local initiatives, allegedly run by Baltic residents.

The most popular, Baltic Bridge, brands itself as the only source of "objective information" about Russia’s views on the Baltic states and as a counterweight to "local propaganda." Its grant proposal proudly highlights the channel’s efforts to debunk "myths" about Soviet occupation by sharing nostalgic photos and videos from the USSR.

Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, a disinformation researcher, told Re:Baltica that romanticizing the Soviet Union is a classic Kremlin tactic to fuel the illusion that "things were better back then." Such nostalgic content spreads easily on social media, she noted: “People willingly share these posts, which amplifies Kremlin propaganda.”

Currently, Baltic Bridge has around 2,040 subscribers but aims to reach 7,000 by year’s end. Its operators claim to have made "great strides," citing analytics from TGstat and Telemeter showing that other Telegram channels have shared its posts 1.3 million times.

“This is a classic tactic for such propaganda networks — they cross-share content to boost their reach,” explains Anastasia Tetarenko-Supe, a researcher at the University of Latvia.

Beyond Telegram, Baltic Bridge also produces video content for YouTube and Rutube. These videos are hosted by Victoria Fyodorova, a former Sputnik correspondent, under the alias "Sipsikova." Each week, Fyodorova — who previously lived in Estonia and speaks Estonian — hosts a half-hour program called Sipsikova’s Networks, mixing irony with “spice and flair” as she discusses Baltic affairs from a Kremlin-friendly perspective. The show’s title references a character from an Estonian children’s book.

Fyodorova frequently mocks Estonia’s former prime minister Kaja Kallas, now a prominent EU foreign policy official and outspoken critic of Russia’s war on Ukraine. When asked by Nekā personīga about her connection to the Estonian-language Telegram channel or her citizenship status, Fyodorova reacted aggressively: “Why don’t I just give you my bank account number too? What kind of ridiculous questions are these?” — before hanging up.

According to the report submitted to Pravfond, YouTube abruptly shut down Baltic Bridge’s channel in April this year, including Fyodorova’s show. This frustrated the project’s backers, who claimed it was rapidly gaining subscribers. “Clearly, we’re on the right track if Baltic authorities are reacting so quickly to our work,” they said.

Re:Baltica has noted a broader crackdown on pro-Kremlin accounts by YouTube this year. After its January exposé, YouTube removed former Latvian MEP Andrejs Mamikins’ channel, as well as Sprats in Exile, a Stefanov-run channel that featured interviews with Baltic migrants praising life in Russia.

Estonia’s internal security agency KAPO cited sanctions violations as the reason: the videos featured sanctioned individuals seeking alternative platforms after Russian propaganda outlets were blocked.

Fighting “russophobia” and helping migrants

The second Russian-language Telegram channel in the network, Baltic Shadows, is less popular but frames itself as a defender of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics. It focuses on what it calls “Russophobia” and offers legal support to compatriots facing persecution.

“These are our people suffering from government oppression — punished for social media posts, laying flowers at Soviet monuments, or arrested under political charges,” the grant application states.

The channel offers a chatbot for legal inquiries and claims it plans to hire a lawyer in Russia familiar with both Baltic and Russian law. Its first-quarter report noted that over 20 people had already sought help — mostly asking about relocation to Russia, dual citizenship, and resettlement paperwork.

Day-to-day, Baltic Shadows republishes news from Russian state agencies and foreign outlets but spins them to fit Moscow’s narrative. For example, while Re:Baltica was working on this article, RIA Novosti reported on Russian naval drills in the Baltic Sea, and Baltnews quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying, “Europeans are not standing in the way of peace.”

The channel also boasts about featuring “respected experts,” including convicted Russian agent-turned-Duma member Maria Butina, energy analyst Alexander Frolov, and several local pro-Kremlin figures like IMHOclub editor Yuri Alekseyev and former Riga city councilor Ruslan Pankratov.

Currently, Baltic Shadows has around 1,028 subscribers, but its operators say their posts have been shared nearly 400,000 times. They aim to reach 5,000 to 6,000 subscribers by year’s end.

“Local” channels with dubious origins

The Baltic-language channels claim to operate independently with their own contributors, yet their content mirrors the pro-Kremlin agenda. The proposal states their purpose is to offer Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians “an alternative viewpoint” aligned with Russia.

Re:Baltica found that Laimes lācis (Latvian) most frequently republishes content from Stefanov’s network, including nostalgic Soviet photos and Fyodorova’s show. However, it remains marginal, with just 163 followers, and did not respond to questions sent via its chatbot.

The Lithuanian channel Vardan tos Lietuvos! also republishes content from Stefanov’s network but limits itself to archival Soviet imagery.

The Estonian-language channel Vana Toomase teataja appears to operate separately and does not share Stefanov’s content, though it also promotes a pessimistic view of the Baltic region.

Estonian outlet Delfi traced this channel to Elena Natalova, a French teacher who recently moved to Russia. She was previously identified by Re:Baltica as an activist pushing Kremlin narratives about Baltic Russians migrating to Russia.

Delfi obtained messages in which Natalova identifies herself as the channel’s operator and arranges paid posts with other Telegram accounts. They also acquired a bank transfer receipt showing Natalova paid €50 from an Estonian bank account for Telegram ads, explicitly listing Vana Toomase teataja as the purpose.

Natalova did not respond to Delfi’s requests for comment.

Re:Baltica also contacted Telegram to ask whether it plans to act against these channels, given their links to an EU-sanctioned entity. The platform has not responded.

Despite EU sanctions, Pravfond continues funneling money into the Baltics to finance pro-Kremlin activists. Among the recipients is Yuri Alekseyev of IMHOclub, who has since fled to Belarus after his activities attracted scrutiny.